ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY FAILS TO RESPOND TO ALLIED INVASION OF SICILY. SHOULD IT HAVE, AND COULD IT HAVE?

 

WHY DID THE ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY FAIL TO REACT TO THE INVASION OF SICILY, AND SHOULD IT HAVE?

     The Royal Italian Navy has faced criticism from many sources for failing to respond in any significant way to the allied invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943.  Was the Royal Italian Navy capable of responding at this point in the war?  What were its resources and capabilities?  What were its limitations?  Should it have mounted a response, or was it wiser to maintain the fleet intact as a possible bargaining tool in an armistice or capitulation negotiation?

     By July, 1943, The Italian Navy had been battling the British and Commonwealth forces in the Mediterranean Sea for three years, as well as substantial American forces since November, 1942 when the allies invaded North Africa.  Italian naval forces had been heavily engaged in combat, particularly destroyers and other light forces assigned to convoy escort duties.  As a result, many of those escort vessels had been lost, as had a number of cruisers.  Italian industry lacked the ability to replace losses with new construction.  Only a small number of new destroyers and only three new small light cruisers had been commissioned by the time of Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. 

     The Italian Navy’s heavy units, the battleships, had not been active for about a year for a number of reasons.  There had developed a severe lack of fuel oil that the large ships needed in order to operate for combat missions.  Italy relied upon shipments of crude oil from the Romanian oil fields, but the deliveries were not forthcoming in the quantities required.  What fuel oil that was received was needed for use by the vital convoy escort vessels.  They had to be given priority.  Another reason for the inactivity of the battleships was lack of a sufficient number of fleet destroyers to provide an adequate anti-submarine escort.  British submarines were very active in the Mediterranean Sea, and they had already sunk a number of Italian warships and damaged many others.  Italy began the war with around 60 destroyers in commission.  By July, 1943 that number had dwindled down to around a dozen, some of which were captured destroyers that had belonged to the French and Yugoslavian navies.  Then there were the issues of lack of a fleet air arm and the inability of the Royal Italian Air Force to provide air cover for Italian warships at sea.  The allies had almost complete air superiority in the region at this point in the war.  As every military power had come to realize, heavy naval units could no longer effectively operate at sea in a war zone without air cover and support.  They were too vulnerable.  Yet another deficiency that hampered the Italian Navy was lack of adequate radar for their warships.  The allies had by this stage in the war installed ever more advanced radar systems on their naval vessels for both air and surface search needs and for gunfire control.  Only a few of the Italian warships had been equipped with an Italian produced radar unit, and it was only suitable for detection.  It provided little or no radar control for gunfire targeting.

     So what naval assets were actually available to the Italians in July, 1943?  Well, there were five battleships in commission.  There was another laid up with only a caretaker crew, another was under repair and modernization, and yet another new one was still under construction.  Two heavy cruisers, of the original number of seven, remained in inventory, however both had been damaged by submarine torpedoes and were out of service.  Nine light cruisers remained in inventory and were still operational, and as mentioned above there were around a dozen destroyers available.  In addition, there were a number of torpedo boats, submarines, and lesser vessels still in commission.  The Italian naval forces were not concentrated.  They had been divided into two components and were stationed at two separate naval bases.  The three newest and most modern battleships, sisters Littorio (later renamed Italia), Vittorio Veneto, and Roma (flagship) were based at La Spezia in Northwest Italy, with supporting cruisers based at nearby Genoa.  These bases were by now well within range of allied bombers.  These warships had been attacked repeatedly from the air and had been damaged a number of times, although repaired.  The other two battleships in commission were of World War I vintage, but they had been completely reconstructed and modernized in the late 1930s.  These were the Andrea Doria and the Caio Duilio.  They were based at Taranto, located in the heel of the Italian boot, far from the other battleships at La Spezia.  The Doria and Duilio had been reduced to reserve status in early 1942, but both had recently been reactivated by the Italian Naval High Command.  Also at Taranto were two light cruisers and two destroyers. 

     The World War I era (but modernized) battleship Giulio Cesare had been taken out of service in early 1942 and eventually moved to the naval base at Pola to receive additional modernization, but this was not carried out.  Instead, she was laid-up with only a caretaker crew.  It would have taken a fair amount of time to bring her back into commission for service with the fleet, but an order to do so was never given.  The Cesare’s sister ship, the battleship Conti de Cavour, had been sunk in November, 1940 when the British launched a carrier-based air raid on the Italian naval base at Taranto.  The Cavour had eventually been re-floated, and about a year after the attack she was sent to the Italian naval base at Trieste, steaming there under her own power, to be fully repaired and modernized with updated secondary and anti-aircraft weaponry.  Work on the Cavour was only 80-85% complete by July, 1943, and work had in fact stopped several months prior in order that escort forces receive priority for materials and repairs.  Lastly, the new battleship Impero, another member of the Littorio class, was also under construction at Trieste, but nowhere close to yet being completed.

     Only one class of new cruisers was under construction.  These were the small light cruisers of the Capitani Romani class.  Only three of them had been completed and put into service.  Several others were building and in various stages of construction, but only the three in commission were operational. 

    To summarize, on July 10, 1943, the Royal Italian Navy had five battleships, nine light cruisers, and about a dozen destroyers available for fleet operations against allied forces, and these were dispersed at two different naval bases located far from one another.

     The small island of Pantelleria off the coast of Sicily had been attacked and captured by the allies in June, 1943.  This was the first piece of the Italian homeland territory that had fallen to the enemy.  The Italian Naval High Command was correct in its belief that Sicily would be the next invasion target of allied forces, although others believed the next target would be Sardinia.  Would the navy mount a defense to the pending invasion, or would it not?  The political situation in Italy had become volatile by this point.  The previously unchallenged dictator, Benito Mussolini, was now facing opposition to his continued hold on power.  Both the fascist party and the Italian King were open, at least discretely, to Mussolini being removed from power.  The Italian population was war weary.  Food and other necessities were in short supply.  Italian cities, including Rome, were now being bombed.  There was little that the Italians and their German partners could do to prevent it.  Many believed that Italy could not continue in the war much longer, and they hoped that there might be an armistice.  The Italians knew that the Germans would not stand by and allow that to happen without intervening and trying to seize the country.  In fact, the Germans already had military plans drawn up to occupy and take control of all of Italy when that time came. 

     The Italian Naval High Command had made plans for the fleet to respond to an invasion of Sicily.  Preparations were underway.  However, Mussolini himself made the decision that the Italian fleet would not sail to oppose the allied landings in Sicily.  Mussolini’s reasons for this may not be completely clear, but because of the several reasons mentioned above, the Italian Navy was not in a position to mount a credible defense of Sicily.  The distance to Sicily from the two Italian naval bases where the two separate components of the fleet were stationed at was considerable.  The two battle squadrons would have undoubtedly come under heavy and sustained allied air attacks long before they could come within striking distance of the allied landing forces at Sicily.  Heavy losses would certainly have been sustained. 

     Yet, despite all of that, one of the primary responsibilities of the Italian navy was to defend the country from attack and invasion.  The navy had a duty to at least make an effort to do so.  By failing to even sortie from base in an attempt to reach Sicily, the Italian fleet faced condemnation from many.  We know that the Germans were very displeased that the Italian Navy did not make a move to attack the allied invasion forces.  The Germans had both land and air forces of their own in Sicily and other parts of Italy.   For quite some time now they had been annoyed with the continued lack of aggressive action by the Italian heavy naval units, which remained inactive in port. 

     In the end, the allied invasion of Sicily was a success for the allies.  Sicily was captured, and the allies next set their sights on the Italian mainland.  The Italians were unable to continue the war.  Mussolini was removed from power and arrested.  The new Italian government concluded an armistice with the allied powers in September, 1943.  All of the Italian fleet units that were still operational were ordered to steam to Malta and surrender to the British.  Although many of the commanding officers objected to the order and contemplated disobeying it, they ultimately agreed to comply.  Most of the vessels eventually reached Malta, however the new battleship Roma, fleet flagship, was attacked on route by Germany bombers.  She was struck by two radio-guided bombs, which penetrated a magazine and caused the ship to explode.  Some Italian vessels instead made it to Spain, a neutral power, and were interned until the end of hostilities.  A number of non-operational warships were captured by the Germans, including the damaged heavy cruisers Bolzano and Gorizia.  The Germans did nothing with them, and they languished in their damaged states.  They were both damaged further by allied forces and later scrapped after the war.

     A few of the Italian light cruisers eventually saw active service with the allied forces after Italy became a co-belligerent against Germany.  The Italians had hoped to be able to retain possession of modern battleships Littorio (Italia) and Vittorio Veneto, but the allies would not permit it.  Both had their guns and machinery disabled, and they would both be scrapped after the war.  Battleships Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio were allowed to remain in Italian hands after the war and served in the post war Italian navy.  Battleship Giulio Cesare was handed over to the Soviet Union as a war prize several years after the war had ended.  The abandoned battleships Conti de Cavour and Impero, both docked at Trieste, were seized by the Germans, but no further work was done on them.  The Cavour was later bombed by the allies and eventually capsized and sank at her moorings as there was no crew on board to try and control flooding.  Both were scrapped after the war.   A number of the surviving light cruisers were also handed over to other allied powers, including France and Greece, as war reparations, while the Italians were permitted to retain others in their service.