WHY DID THE ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY FAIL TO REACT TO THE INVASION
OF SICILY, AND SHOULD IT HAVE?
The Royal Italian
Navy has faced criticism from many sources for failing to respond in any
significant way to the allied invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943. Was the Royal Italian Navy capable of
responding at this point in the war?
What were its resources and capabilities? What were its limitations? Should it have mounted a response, or was it
wiser to maintain the fleet intact as a possible bargaining tool in an
armistice or capitulation negotiation?
By July, 1943,
The Italian Navy had been battling the British and Commonwealth forces in the
Mediterranean Sea for three years, as well as substantial American forces since
November, 1942 when the allies invaded North Africa. Italian naval forces had been heavily engaged
in combat, particularly destroyers and other light forces assigned to convoy
escort duties. As a result, many of
those escort vessels had been lost, as had a number of cruisers. Italian industry lacked the ability to
replace losses with new construction.
Only a small number of new destroyers and only three new small light
cruisers had been commissioned by the time of Operation Husky, the invasion of
Sicily.
The Italian
Navy’s heavy units, the battleships, had not been active for about a year for a
number of reasons. There had developed a
severe lack of fuel oil that the large ships needed in order to operate for
combat missions. Italy relied upon
shipments of crude oil from the Romanian oil fields, but the deliveries were
not forthcoming in the quantities required.
What fuel oil that was received was needed for use by the vital convoy
escort vessels. They had to be given
priority. Another reason for the
inactivity of the battleships was lack of a sufficient number of fleet
destroyers to provide an adequate anti-submarine escort. British submarines were very active in the
Mediterranean Sea, and they had already sunk a number of Italian warships and
damaged many others. Italy began the war
with around 60 destroyers in commission.
By July, 1943 that number had dwindled down to around a dozen, some of
which were captured destroyers that had belonged to the French and Yugoslavian
navies. Then there were the issues of
lack of a fleet air arm and the inability of the Royal Italian Air Force to
provide air cover for Italian warships at sea.
The allies had almost complete air superiority in the region at this
point in the war. As every military
power had come to realize, heavy naval units could no longer effectively
operate at sea in a war zone without air cover and support. They were too vulnerable. Yet another deficiency that hampered the
Italian Navy was lack of adequate radar for their warships. The allies had by this stage in the war
installed ever more advanced radar systems on their naval vessels for both air
and surface search needs and for gunfire control. Only a few of the Italian warships had been
equipped with an Italian produced radar unit, and it was only suitable for
detection. It provided little or no radar control
for gunfire targeting.
So what naval
assets were actually available to the Italians in July, 1943? Well, there were five battleships in
commission. There was another laid up
with only a caretaker crew, another was under repair and modernization, and yet
another new one was still under construction.
Two heavy cruisers, of the original number of seven, remained in
inventory, however both had been damaged by submarine torpedoes and were out of
service. Nine light cruisers remained in
inventory and were still operational, and as mentioned above there were around
a dozen destroyers available. In
addition, there were a number of torpedo boats, submarines, and lesser vessels
still in commission. The Italian naval
forces were not concentrated. They had
been divided into two components and were stationed at two separate naval
bases. The three newest and most modern
battleships, sisters Littorio (later renamed Italia), Vittorio Veneto, and Roma
(flagship) were based at La Spezia in Northwest Italy, with supporting cruisers
based at nearby Genoa. These bases were
by now well within range of allied bombers.
These warships had been attacked repeatedly from the air and had been
damaged a number of times, although repaired.
The other two battleships in commission were of World War I vintage, but
they had been completely reconstructed and modernized in the late 1930s. These were the Andrea Doria and the Caio
Duilio. They were based at Taranto,
located in the heel of the Italian boot, far from the other battleships at La
Spezia. The Doria and Duilio had been
reduced to reserve status in early 1942, but both had recently been reactivated
by the Italian Naval High Command. Also
at Taranto were two light cruisers and two destroyers.
The World War I
era (but modernized) battleship Giulio Cesare had been taken out of service in
early 1942 and eventually moved to the naval base at Pola to receive additional
modernization, but this was not carried out.
Instead, she was laid-up with only a caretaker crew. It would have taken a fair amount of time to
bring her back into commission for service with the fleet, but an order to do
so was never given. The Cesare’s sister
ship, the battleship Conti de Cavour, had been sunk in November, 1940 when the
British launched a carrier-based air raid on the Italian naval base at Taranto. The Cavour had eventually been re-floated,
and about a year after the attack she was sent to the Italian naval base at
Trieste, steaming there under her own power, to be fully repaired and
modernized with updated secondary and
anti-aircraft weaponry. Work on the
Cavour was only 80-85% complete by July, 1943, and work had in fact stopped several months prior in order that escort forces receive priority for materials and
repairs. Lastly, the new battleship
Impero, another member of the Littorio class, was also under construction at
Trieste, but nowhere close to yet being completed.
Only one class of
new cruisers was under construction.
These were the small light cruisers of the Capitani Romani class. Only three of them had been completed and put
into service. Several others were
building and in various stages of construction, but only the three in
commission were operational.
To summarize, on
July 10, 1943, the Royal Italian Navy had five battleships, nine light
cruisers, and about a dozen destroyers available for fleet operations against
allied forces, and these were dispersed at two different naval bases located
far from one another.
The small island
of Pantelleria off the coast of Sicily had been attacked and captured by the
allies in June, 1943. This was the first
piece of the Italian homeland territory that had fallen to the enemy. The Italian Naval High Command was correct in
its belief that Sicily would be the next invasion target of allied forces,
although others believed the next target would be Sardinia. Would the navy mount a defense to the pending
invasion, or would it not? The political
situation in Italy had become volatile by this point. The previously unchallenged dictator, Benito
Mussolini, was now facing opposition to his continued hold on power. Both the fascist party and the Italian King
were open, at least discretely, to Mussolini being removed from power. The Italian population was war weary. Food and other necessities were in short
supply. Italian cities, including Rome,
were now being bombed. There was little
that the Italians and their German partners could do to prevent it. Many believed that Italy could not continue
in the war much longer, and they hoped that there might be an armistice. The Italians knew that the Germans would not
stand by and allow that to happen without intervening and trying to seize the
country. In fact, the Germans already
had military plans drawn up to occupy and take control of all of Italy when
that time came.
The Italian Naval
High Command had made plans for the fleet to respond to an invasion of
Sicily. Preparations were underway. However, Mussolini himself made the decision
that the Italian fleet would not sail to oppose the allied landings in
Sicily. Mussolini’s reasons for this may
not be completely clear, but because of the several reasons mentioned above,
the Italian Navy was not in a position to mount a credible defense of
Sicily. The distance to Sicily from the
two Italian naval bases where the two separate components of the fleet were stationed at was considerable. The two battle squadrons would have
undoubtedly come under heavy and sustained allied air attacks long before they could
come within striking distance of the allied landing forces at Sicily. Heavy losses would certainly have been
sustained.
Yet, despite all
of that, one of the primary responsibilities of the Italian navy was to defend
the country from attack and invasion.
The navy had a duty to at least make an effort to do so. By failing to even sortie from base in an
attempt to reach Sicily, the Italian fleet faced condemnation from many. We know that the Germans were very displeased
that the Italian Navy did not make a move to attack the allied invasion
forces. The Germans had both land and
air forces of their own in Sicily and other parts of Italy. For quite some time now they had been annoyed with the continued lack of
aggressive action by the Italian heavy naval units, which remained inactive in
port.
In the end, the
allied invasion of Sicily was a success for the allies.
Sicily was captured, and the allies next set their sights on the Italian
mainland. The Italians were unable to
continue the war. Mussolini was removed
from power and arrested. The new Italian
government concluded an armistice with the allied powers in September,
1943. All of the Italian fleet units
that were still operational were ordered to steam to Malta and surrender to the
British. Although many of the commanding
officers objected to the order and contemplated disobeying it, they ultimately
agreed to comply. Most of the vessels
eventually reached Malta, however the new battleship Roma, fleet flagship, was
attacked on route by Germany bombers.
She was struck by two radio-guided bombs, which penetrated a magazine
and caused the ship to explode. Some
Italian vessels instead made it to Spain, a neutral power, and were interned
until the end of hostilities. A number
of non-operational warships were captured by the Germans, including the damaged
heavy cruisers Bolzano and Gorizia. The Germans did nothing with them, and they languished in their damaged states. They
were both damaged further by allied forces and later scrapped after the war.
A few of the
Italian light cruisers eventually saw active service with the allied forces
after Italy became a co-belligerent against Germany. The Italians had hoped to be able to retain
possession of modern battleships Littorio (Italia) and Vittorio Veneto, but the
allies would not permit it. Both had
their guns and machinery disabled, and they would both be scrapped after the
war. Battleships Andrea Doria and Caio
Duilio were allowed to remain in Italian hands after the war and served in the
post war Italian navy. Battleship Giulio
Cesare was handed over to the Soviet Union as a war prize several years after
the war had ended. The abandoned
battleships Conti de Cavour and Impero, both docked at Trieste, were seized by
the Germans, but no further work was done on them. The Cavour was later bombed by the allies and
eventually capsized and sank at her moorings as there was no crew on board to try and control flooding. Both
were scrapped after the war. A number of the surviving light cruisers were
also handed over to other allied powers, including France and Greece, as war
reparations, while the Italians were permitted to retain others in their
service.
